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THE MULTIPLE MUDDLES OF
MAVERICK MOLINISM
Thomas P. Flint

In a recent article in this journal, Jonathan Kvanvig maintains that it is plausible (and even preferable) for a Molinist to think of God as having control
over which counterfactuals of creaturely freedom are true. This position is
closely related to one I once labeled Maverick Molinism, a position that I
argued was incoherent. In this response to Kvanvig, I attempt to show that
his defense of Maverick Molinism is misguided in several ways.

According to the Molinist picture of providence, God's governance
of his world is guided by his knowledge of counterfactuals that tell him
what any of his creatures blessed with libertarian freedom would freely
do in any non-determining situation in which that creature might be
placed. But what status vis-a-vis divine power are we to ascribe to such
counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, as they have come to be called? Is
any such conditional one that God simply has to "put up with", or one
over which he has at least counterfactual power - power to do something such that, were he so to act, the conditional in question would
have been false?
Such questions are brought to the fore in a recent discussion by
Jonathan Kvanvig of a view that I earlier labeled Maverick Molinism. 1
Kvanvig argues that my anathematization of the Mavericks was out of
order, and that Maverick Molinism actually offers a more plausible position than that championed by more traditional Molinists - i.e., than what I
shall call Mainline Molinism.
In this response, I will first summarize (briefly) what Maverick
Molinism is and (very briefly) my reasons for rejecting it. I will then present Kvanvig's defense of the Mavericks and explain why I see Kvanvig's
position as mired irremediably in a multitude of muddles.
I
In Divine Providence, a Maverick Molinist was defined as one who says
that God has control over what are known as counterfactuals of world actualization - conditionals specifying, for any complete creative act of will God
might perform, what world would become actual in the wake of that act of
wilP Suppose we let V stand for a particular creative act of will within
God's power. The Maverick Molinist, like all Molinists, agrees that there
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is a fact of the matter about what world would be actual were God so to
will- a truth such as
(1) V

~

W,

where W stands for a possible world and our symbolization is taken as
shorthand for If God were to perform creative act of will V, possible world W
would be actual. What makes the Maverick a Maverick, I suggested, was
her contention that conditionals such as (1) are postvolitional - i.e., dependent upon God's free will. Whatever truth-value (1) has, the Maverick
argues, there is something God could do such that, were he to do it, (1)
would have the opposite truth-value. Counterfactuals of world-actualization, then, are one and all under divine control.
On the other hand, I claimed, Mainline Molinists would initially be
inclined to think of such counterfactuals as prevolitional - that is, as true or
false independent of God's will. Most Molinists, I speculated, would be
drawn to this position because of their belief that garden-variety counterfactuals of creaturely freedom are true or false prevolitionally. For if these
ordinary counterfactuals are immune from divine control, it's hard to see
how the more global counterfactuals of world-actualization could be
dependent upon God's will.
In Divine Providence, I offered a rather complicated argument to show
that Maverick Molinism would not only seem prima facie implausible to
most Molinists, but is in fact an incoherent view. Even the Maverick, I suggested, would have to agree that any complete creative act of God's will
would either render (1) true or render it false. To avoid a vicious regress,
she would also need to concede that the fact that a certain act of divine will
would render (1) true (or false) would not itselfbe a fact over which God
had any control. Hence, since V itself represents a complete creative act of
will, either V implies (1) is true prevolitionally or V implies ~(1) is. Either
way, though, incoherence ensues for the Maverick. For if V implies (1) is
true prevolitionally, then so is (1). On the other hand, if it's V implies -(1)
that's prevolitionally true, then -(1) turns out to be prevolitional as well.
So, necessarily, either (1) or -(1) is prevolitional. And that means that,
necessarily, the Maverick is mistaken: counterfactuals of world-actualization are not under God's control.
II
In his brief on behalf of Maverick Molinism, Kvanvig curiously spends
much of his time taking potshots at elements (or alleged elements) of this
argument only to concede in the end that such means of defending the
Maverick are fairly limp. If we ignore the red herrings and dead ends that
Kvanvig introduces, though, his defense of Maverick Molinism can be seen
to revolve around three contentions. First, he suggests, in speaking of
truths as prevolitional, Molinists have typically conflated two separate
notions. Second, there is no reason to think that counterfactuals of worldactualization would differ from counterfactuals of creaturely freedom with
respect to either of the two notions. And third, Molinists would be well-
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advised to maintain that counterfactuals of both types are under God's
control. Let me expand on each of these three points in tum.
First, then, what are the two notions that Mainline Molinists have often
conflated with their references to the prevolitional? According to Kvanvig,
to say that a proposition is prevolitional is simply to say that its truth value
"does not obtain in virtue of any act of God's will".3 Molinists have often
confused this notion with that of a proposition's being outside God's control. Kvanvig maintains, though, that the two ideas are separate, not just in
the case of God but in general.
There are lots of truths that are true independently of our wills, and yet
we have or had the power to act in such a way that those truths would
not have been true. For example, snow is found at certain precise spatiotemporal points north of where I live, but no act of will on my part
caused the snow to be there. Yet, there are things I could do or could
have done [e.g., lay a snow-shovel on the ground] which would have
prevented the presence of snow at some such particular spot. 4
Following Kvanvig's lead, let us say that a truth Tis prevolitional for a person 5 if and only if it's not the case that T is true in virtue of some act of 5' s
will. And, introducing a new term, let us say that a truth T is resilient for a
person 5 if and only if 5 lacks counterfactual power over T - i.e., if and
only if it's not the case that 5 has or had the power to act in such a way that
T would not have been true. Kvanvig's contention amounts to the claim
that something can be prevolitional for a person without being resilient for
them. Molinists have generally used "prevolitional" to cover both of these
notions. By doing so, he charges, they have obscured an important conceptual distinction and vitiated the Maverick Molinist's best line of defense.
Part of that defense, Kvanvig suggests, is for the Maverick to deny that
there is anything special about counterfactuals of world-actualization vis-avis these two notions. Kvanvig agrees that there is solid reason for thinking
that counterfactuals of creaturely freedom would have to be prevolitionaP
if God makes it true that Joe would kick his dog in certain circum-

stances, then Joe does not have the power to do other than to kick his
dog in those circumstances. And if he does not have this power, then
the counterfactual in question is not a counterfactual of libertarian
freedom. If this argument is sound, as I will grant here, it is a further
commitment of Molinism to hold that counterfactuals of libertarian
freedom are divinely prevolitional .... 6
Notice, though, that this is an argument only for prevolitionality, not for
resilience. Now, the argument for prevolitionality, one would think,
would apply just as much to counterfactuals of world-actualization as it
does to counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. So the two types of counterfactuals do not seem interestingly different. In each case, it seems, the
Molinist has strong reasons for thinking that counterfactuals of that type
are prevolitional, but (at least at this point) no reason for concluding that
those counterfactuals are also resilient.
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And this takes us to the third element of Kvanvig's defense of Maverick
Molinism: we actually have good reason for thinking that counterfactuals
of either type are not resilient. Kvanvig presents his argument for this contention by means of an example:
... it is contingently true that if I were offered a choice between
asparagus and beans for dinner, I'd not choose beans. Things could
have happened to alter my preferences, however. The proliferation of
special pests that blunted the growth of beans but allowed asparagus
to flourish would have led to much more asparagus consumption in
my youth, and to a preference for the unusual taste of beans over that
of asparagus (I'm assuming here that the core of the explanation of
my preference for asparagus over green beans is the rarity of the former over the latter in my diet). So, suppose that this is an example in
which C - (A - B) is true, even though the counterfactual embedded
in the consequent is false. For that embedded counterfactual to be
within God's control, we need only assume that God could make C
true (could strongly actualize that state of affairs), and it would be
perplexing indeed to find someone denying that claim. So, if God
could actualize C, then God has power over the truth value of A - B,
even if we assume with Molinism that the truth value of A - B is prevolitional?
Kvanvig implies that the conclusion of this argument applies both to
counterfactuals of creaturely freedom and to counterfactuals of worldactualization, and thus demonstrates the preferability of Maverick
Molinism to its Mainline alternative. This preferability is intensified, he
suggests, when we recognize that the Maverick, unlike the Mainline
Molinist, need not view counterfactuals as putting limitations upon what
worlds God can actualize. Hence, Maverick Molinism fits in more neatly
with a strong affirmation of divine omnipotence. Finally, he maintains, we
can also now isolate precisely where the argument of Divine Providence
goes wrong. Because of the typical Mainline conflation of the prevolitional
with the resilient, that argument assumed that, to avoid a vicious regress,
even the Maverick would have to concede the resilience of a counterfactual
such as V implies -(1). Once we recognize the Mainline confusion here,
though, we realize that it is only the prevolitional status, not the resilience,
of such counterfactuals that the Maverick needs to affirm. The Maverick,
in other words, can say that
(1) V - W

is under divine control, because for some X under God's control,
(2) X - -(V - W);

that (2) is under divine control because for some Y under God's control,
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(3) Y -- -[X -- -(V -- W)];

that (3) is under divine control for similar reasons, and so on. So long as
the Maverick also insists that each member of the regress of non-resilient
truths thus generated is prevolitional ( i.e., that none of these truths is true
in virtue of any act of God's will), we have no regress of divine actions, and
hence no cause for concern.
III
It seems to me that Kvanvig is misguided in two of the three major
points he makes in defending Maverick Molinism. This implies, of course,
that I think he is correct on one of the three. Where does he manage to get
things right? On the second of his three points. It is, as Kvanvig implies,
hard to see how the Maverick could discern any substantial difference
(with respect to either prevolitionality or resiliency) between counterfactuals of world-actualization and regular counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. Let me note, though, that, although I am inclined to agree with
Kvanvig here, I am not convinced that compelling arguments can be marshaled to undergird his point. As far as I can see, the Maverick who maintained that counterfactuals of creaturely freedom were resilient, while
counterfactuals of world actualization were not, would be guilty of no
demonstrable logical inconsistency.8 Still, it is monumentally hard to see
what would motivate such a position. So Kvanvig's suggestion here seems
reasonable to me; there is no good reason not to place both types of counterfactuals in the same boats.
Kvanvig, of course, thinks that the two boats available - the prevolitional and the resilient - are dramatically different. There is, to be sure, a kernel of truth in this, the first of the three main points Kvanvig makes. For
many of us human agents, there are truths that would have been false had
we acted in a certain way, even though no act of will on our part played a
role in their becoming true. His example of the snow shovel makes this
point effectively. The presence of snow in a certain location may well be
counterfactually dependent on my not having acted in a certain way. But
if I never so much as considered shielding that patch of earth with the
shovel, if no decision or act of will on my part took place regarding the
shovel and the snow, then we can indeed make sense of the suggestion
that the presence of the snow is prevolitional. So states of affairs can, in a
sense, be prevolitional but non-resilient with respect to us humans.
But only in a sense. In a deeper sense, it seems to me, such states are not
fully or sheerly prevolitional. Suppose we were endeavoring to explain
why that bit of ground is snow-covered. Since I thought nothing and
willed nothing with respect to that bit of ground, it's clear that no such act
of will or thought should playa part in our explanation. But if (as we're
assuming) I was able to prevent the presence of the snow, then a full explanation needs to acknowledge that I refrained from performing the preventive act that was within my power. Even if I never decided not to perform
this act, the fact is that, in the circumstances that were actually in place, my
refraining was a non-determined necessary condition of that patch of
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ground becoming snow-covered. The fate of the earth (in the relevant location) was not independent of what was going on in my mind and will at
the relevant time. In that sense, it was neither prevolitional nor resilient.
Suppose, though, that the thought of keeping that patch of ground snowfree had entered my mind. Suppose I knew that doing so was in my power; I
knew precisely how to act so as to keep that location dry. Suppose I thought
it over, weighed the various alternatives, and ultimately decided not to use
the shovel. In such a case, it seems even more clear that the presence of the
snow was not, in any meaningful sense, independent of my will. Here, a
full explanation of why the snow is there would have to take account of the
various acts and processes going on in my mind. So the ground's being
snow-covered would obviously be both post-volitional and non-resilient.
Here too, the distinction upon which Kvanvig relies seems to have no place.
When we try to apply these notions to God, though, it is even harder to
see how a wedge could ever be driven between them. For God could never
be ignorant of any creative option open to him. If he knows via middle
knowledge that (A -+ B) is false, but also knows that, for some C that was
open to him, [C -+ (A -+ B)], then it follows that, at some logically prior
moment, he faced a choice: should he create a world in which (A -+ B) is true
or a world in which it is false? True, his course of action in the two types of
worlds will be slightly different. Should he decide to make a -(A -+ B)world, he'll do things as he in fact did them in the actual world, where he
decided not to actualize C. On the other hand, should he opt for a (A -+ B)world, he'll need to actualize C. But in either case, the counterfactual has the
truth value it ends up with simply because God decided to make it have that
truth value. 9 No such counterfactual could meaningfully be considered true
or false independent of God's will. And that means that, on the Maverick's
scenario, no such counterfactual would be prevolitional; each would be
postvolitional and non-resilient.
Now, the contention that there are true but postvolitional contingent
counterfactuals of creaturely freedom is not unknown. It is the position
that, following tradition, I labeled Thomism in Divine Providence. It is an
honorable position, one that many admirable philosophers have adopted.
But it just isn't Molinism, and only confusion can ensue if we label it a
Molinist stance. Maverick Molinism, as developed by Kvanvig, isn't a
Molinist view at all. It's simply a rather odd version of Thomism.
To see more clearly the differences between Molinism and the Thomism
of the Kvanvigian Maverick, consider the divine "moments" sometimes
alluded to by Molinists in trying to picture, in the least-misleading way
available to us humans, the "procession" in God's knowledge. God's natural knowledge (i.e., his knowledge of necessary truths) is prior to (i.e.,
independent of) his middle knowledge, which is prior to his creative decision as to which creatures to create in which situations, which in tum is
prior to his free knowledge (i.e., knowledge of contingent truths dependent
upon his action). So we can think of four logical moments, with natural
knowledge present at the first, middle knowledge at the second, God's creative act of will at the third, and free knowledge at the fourth.lO
With the Maverick, though, this picture becomes much more convoluted.
We begin, as usual, with natural knowledge. In the second moment, God
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knows the entire ascending hierarchy of more and more complicated counterfactuals specifying what actions he would need to take to effect various
counterfactuals' being true. So, at the second moment, he knows that if he
makes one decision (call it C), (A ~ B) will be true, while if he acts in another
way (say, D), (A ~ -B) will be true. He also knows that the truth of [C ~ (A
~ B)] is itself up to him; should he will one way (E, say), then [C ~ (A ~ B)]
will be true, while another divine decision (for example, F) will make [C ~
-(A ~ B)] true. And so on, for more and more complex counterfactuals
incorporating multiply embedded counterfactuals. At the third moment,
God decides which way things will in fact be with regard to all these COLmterfactuals. Perhaps he decides that he would like to have (A ~ B) and [C ~
(A ~ B)] be true. If so, he decides, in the third moment, to bring about C and
E (and so on). In the fourth moment, C and E (and so on) have their foreknown effects; the former brings it about that (A ~ B), the latter that [C ~ (A
~ B)], and so on. In the fifth moment, God decides which creatures to create
in which situations. Finally, in the sixth moment, God has free knowledge.
Of course, one is tempted to respond, there is no real, genuine creaturely
freedom of the libertarian sort left in this picture. For everything that matters is solely up to God. He makes certain counterfactuals of creaturely
freedom true, and he makes the antecedents of some of them true. If (A ~
B) is true, that's simply because God, on his own, decided that it would be
true. If A is also true, that's also simply because God, on his own, decided
that it would be true. But it surely seems to follow from this that, if B is
true, that too is simply because God, on his own, decided that it would be
true. If one shares the semi-compatibilist picture of freedom common
among Thomists, this might not seem deleterious to the agent's freedom.
But Molinists, of course, are not semi-compatibilists.
There is much more one might say about Kvanvig's position here. For
example, since the distinction between the prevolitional and the resilient
falls apart in the divine case, the vicious regress of divine actions, a regress
that Kvanvig thought he had eliminated, returns with full force;l1 hence,
his attempt to neutralize my argument from Divine Providence collapses.
But perhaps enough has been said at this point to show that Kvanvig's first
major point - that something can be prevolitional for God without being
resilient - is mistaken.
What, though, of his third major point? Doesn't his example of the
beans and asparagus show that there are actual cases of counterfactuals of
creaturely freedom that are true, yet such that God could have made them
false? I think not. First, note the method of reasoning that seems implicit
in Kvanvig's example. We begin by supposing that in fact I'd not choose
beans if I were offered beans or asparagus - i.e., we suppose that (A ~
-B). We then consider what I would have done in a world where pests
made beans rare in my youth - i.e., where C is true. What we seem to be
asking ourselves here is: If I had to make the choice between beans and
asparagus in a world where the pests had been mean to beans, would I still
choose the asparagus? I.e., is [(C & A) ~ -B] also true? We answer, quite
reasonably, that it probably isn't; rather, [(C & A) ~ B] seems to be correct.
And from [(C & A) ~ B], we conclude that [C ~ (A ~ B)].
There are two things to note about this argument. First, the Mainline
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Molinist needn't necessarily be troubled by it. For such Molinists traditionally have maintained that a conditional is a counterfactual of creaturely
freedom only if its antecedent is complete - i.e., only if the antecedent specifies the complete set of non-determining circumstances in which the creature in question is placed. Such a stipulation has seemed reasonable both
to proponents and opponents of Molinism; if God does make his providential decisions based on his knowledge of what his creatures would do, that
knowledge must be of the all-things-considered sort - knowledge of what
his creatures would do given all of the circumstances influencing their
activity. These are the counterfactuals over which Mainline Molinists deny
divine control; they needn't deny that God might have control over counterfactuals with less than complete antecedents. So, if A is not complete,
Kvanvig's example is simply of no relevance, since it wouldn't point to an
issue over which Mainline Molinists and Mavericks diverge.
The second point to note about the argument is that the final step from [(C & A) -- B] to [C -- (A -- B)] - is not, as it stands, valid. Suppose
[(C & A) -- B], but C -- -A. Then it could be that, in the nearest C-world,
it's true that, had A been the case, it would have been the case that -B. In
other words, if (C -- -A), then it could be that [(C & A) -- B] is true, but [C
-- (A -- B)] is false. So the final step of the chain of reasoning upon which
Kvanvig seems to be relying appears faulty.
Now one might think that neither of these objections need prove fatal to
Kvanvig's argument. Why not stipulate that the antecedent of the relevant
counterfactual- i.e., A - is complete, and hence that with (A ~ B) we have
a counterfactual over which Mainline Molinists and Mavericks really differ? And why not secure the final step of the argument by simply maintaining that (C ~ A) - that had the pests in fact infested the beans during
my youth, I still would have been in exactly the same beans-or-asparaguschoosing situation we were considering? By making both of these stipulations, would we not have an argument that was both clearly valid and injurious to the Mainline Molinist stance?
In a word: No. For the two stipulations are simply inconsistent with
Kvanvig's claim that (A ~ -B) and [C ~ (A ~ B)] are both true. Suppose
that we stipulate that A is complete. Then it must either include or preclude the presence in the past of those beans-destroying pests. That is,
either (A ~ C) or (A ~ _C).12 Whichever one is true, though, (C -- A) is
false.
Suppose first that (A ~ C). Were it also the case that (C -- A), then C
would counterfactually imply whatever A counterfactually implies. But we
are assuming that (A ~ -B). Hence, (C ~ -B) would also be'true. Since
Kvanvig is claiming that [C -- (A ~ B)] is also true, it would then follow
that IC -- [(A ~ B) & -B]l. But [(A ~ B) & -B] entails -A. Hence, it would
follow that (C ~ -A). But this, of course, is inconsistent with our assumption that (C ~ A).13 So if (A ~ C), then it's not the case that (C ~ A).
Suppose, on the other hand, that (A ~ -C). In that case, C entails -A. And
if C entails -A, it's clearly not the case that C counterfactually implies A. So
if (A ~ -C), then -(C -- A).
So, whether (A ~ C) or (A ~ -C), it's not the case that (C ~ A). But, as
we've seen, without (C ~ A), there's no evident way for Kvanvig to get
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from [(C & A) --l> B] to [C --l> (A --l> B)]. So Kvanvig faces a choice less
savory than that between beans and asparagus: he can make his argument
irrelevant or make it invalid. Whichever his choice, Mainline Molinism
escapes unscathed.
Note, by the way, that our examination of his arguments reveals that
another of Kvanvig's claims - that the Maverick places fewer restrictions
on God's omnipotence than does the Mainline Molinist - is also bogus.
Kvanvig's idea seems to be that, if [C --l> (A --l> B)] is true, then God isn't
precluded by the truth of (A --l> -B) from making a world in which both A
and B are true. But if the counterfactuals in question are complete, then (as
we have seen) [C --l> (A --l> B)] and (A --l> -B) could both be true only if (C --l>
-A). And if the very act that would render (A --l> B) true would also render
A false, then even Kvanvig's Maverick offers us no course of action God
can follow to secure a world in which both A and B are true.
IV

I conclude, then, that Kvanvig has offered us no reason to doubt the
stance defended in Divine Providence. Maverick Molinism is a confused
and contradictory position. There are, to be sure, alternatives to Molinism
that are worthy of serious consideration. Maverick Molinism, though, is
not one of them. 15
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NOTES
1. Jonathan Kvanvig, "On Behalf of Maverick Molinism," Faith and
Philosophy 19 (2002), pp. 348-357. For my earlier discussion of Maverick
Molinism, see Thomas P. Flint, Divine Providence: The Molinist Account (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), pp. 65-70.
2. By a complete creative act of will, I mean a divine decision concerning
which creatures are to be created in which circumstances. See Divine
Providence, 36-37.
3. Kvanvig, "On Behalf of Maverick Molinism," p. 348.
4. Ibid., p. 354.
5. Here and throughout the ensuing discussion, I will generally use "pre-

volitional" and "resilient" as shorthand for "prevolitional for God" and
"resilient for God" respectively.
6. Kvanvig, "On Behalf of Maverick Molinism," p. 348.
7. Ibid., pp. 354-355.
8. Were the Maverick to view true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom
as resilient in every world in which they are true, logical inconsistency would
be demonstrable. And it would be exceedingly odd if such resiliency were to
prove contingent. But, of course, a philosophical stance can be odd without
being incoherent.
9. Kvanvig himself could hardly object to the "make" language here, since
he uses it himself: "If there is a world God could actualize such that the 'A ---<>
B' -worlds are farther away from the world thus actualized than some -(A ---<>
BY-worlds, then there is something God could do that would have made that
I
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cOlmterfactual false."
10. See Divine Providence, pp. 36-43.
11. To make (A ~ B) true by doing C, God first has to make it true that [C
~ (A ~ B)]. But the "first" is misleading. For if D is the divine action that
makes [C ~ (A ~ B)] true, then God has to make it true that ID ~ [C ~ (A ~
B)]} before he can make it true that [C ...... (A ~ B)]. And if E is the divine
action that makes ID ~ [C ~ (A ~B)]} true, then God has to .... And so it
goes. Every action that God is to perform on this picture requires that a logically prior action already have been performed. But then there's no way even for
God to get the whole process started.
12. The double-line arrow represents entailment (i.e., strict implication).
13. I am assuming here and throughout that C is not itself impossible. Of
course, if C were impossible, things would be even worse for Kvanvig. So the
assumption is one that Kvanvig could hardly call into question.
14. Could Kvanvig retort that he has no need to move to [C ~ (A ~ B)] via
[(C & A) ~ B]? Could he say that the beans-or-asparagus example warrants
the move directly to [C ~ (A ~ B)]? If A were incomplete, such a response
might have force. But, as already noted, an incomplete A makes the example
irrelevant to the question of whether God might have control over genuine
counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. On the other hand, if we limit ourselves
to counterfactuals of freedom with complete antecedents, why in the world
would anyone think, without argument, that (A ...... -B) would have a different
truth value in a pestilential world? After all, A already says all that can be said
about the presence or absence of the relevant pests. To see the point here more
clearly, suppose we let 5 stand for the actual pestless past in our world and 0
stand for my having the choice between beans and asparagus. (A ~ -B) could
then be equivalently represented as [(5 & 0) ...... -B]. Now, Kvanvig's example
gives us good reason to think my choice would have been different in a world
with a different (i.e., a pestiferous) past. That is, if we let T stand for such a
past, the example warrants our thinking that [(T & 0) ...... B], and perhaps even
that [T ~ (0 ...... B)]. But the example offers no evident support whatsoever to
the suggestion that (T & 0), or any of (T & O)'s entailments (such as C) implies
[(5 & 0) ...... B]. So the claim that the example offers direct support to [C ...... (A
...... B)] is either irrelevant or false.
15. I am grateful to Chris Blauwkamp, Cristian Mihut, Christian Miller and
especially Thad Botham for discussion of Kvanvig's paper. Thanks are also
due to William Hasker for his comments on an earlier draft of this essay.

